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Abstract
Irt the at,iation commwnity, the early detection of o possible subsgstcm
problem dcvelopirtg during a flight is poterttiallg uscfal for irtcv(asirtg the
safety of the flight becausc the <rtrn time may allow the .[light cvcw more
options for & alin9 with a failure. Commercial airlift,s arc cuvrc_ttl 9 usill9
twin-engine airvraft for c:rtcndcd (vat,sport-opcratio'ns o_cv water. _md tt,
early dctcctiorl of a possibh', prwblcm 'might increase th.c .flight crew's optiorls
for s@ly landing th.c aircraft. ()m_ method for dccreasirtg the scl,crity
of a dc_clopiug problem is to predict the bc,ha_iov of the problem so th,t
appropriatc corrective actior_s (:art bc takers. To irrvcstigatc the pilots'
ability to predict long-torah events, a comp'atcv workstation c:rpcrimcr_t was
conducted in which 18 airliru_ pilots p rcdicttd the alert time (the time to
an alert) using 3 diffcrcTd dial displays and ,7 d_ffcrcr_t paromctcr-beha_ior
temple:city levels. Tit(: three dial displays u!crr as follow,s: (1) stamtavd
(resembling c'uvvcnt aircraft rou_ld dial prcscntatior_s): (2) history (irtdicatir_g
the cwrrent value plus the value of th.c parameter 5 scc i_ the past): _lrtd
(,7) predictive (imlicali_g th.c c'uvvcnt _,aluc plus the t,aluc of the p(tvamctcr
5 scc into liT(: future). The time proJilcs dcscribirlg the b(hat,ior of tilt
parameter consisted of co_lstant rate-@change pvofl'.lcs, dccclcrati_9 pro.Jilts.
and accelerating-theft-decelerating pvoJilcs. Although. the pilots indicated that
they prcfcrrcd the near-term prcdictic, e dial, th.c objective data (lid rwt support
its use. The objc, ctivc data did show that the time profiles had th.c most
signiJicartt effect on perfov'm.ancc irt estimating the time to a,n alert.
Introduction
In the aviation community, the early detection of
a possible subsystem t)robh'nl developing dm'ing a
flight is potentially useful for" increasing the safety of
the flight because the extra time may allow the flight
crew xnore options for dealing with a failure. An
Aviation Safi'ty I/eport, ing System (ASRS) (ref. 1)
database search revealed a significant Tmmber of inci-
dents involving slowly developing consequences from
failures. These failures included leaks in the fuel, oil,
hydraulic, and vacuum subsystems and engine flame-
outs. Furthermore, in sonm accidents investigated by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
Nult consequences occurred well before a subsystem
parameter entered an alert range. One example is the
Eastern Airlines flight 855 accident (ref. 2), whose
root cause was all oil leak due to missing O-rings in
the engines. In that accident, after the mmfl)er 2
engille had faile(t and been shut down because of a
low-oil al(wt, the oil quantities of the nulnl)er 1 an(1
mlnfl)er 3 engines decreased fl)r 15 to 20 tninutes [)e-
fore the low-oil alerts occurre(t for those engines. By
that time, it was too late to avert a ilear-catastrophic
failure of the engine subsystem. If the crew had no-
tice(t the problem earlier, they possibly could have
saved the affecte(t systems for lan(ting.
Also, a rapidly developing area in eonuncreiaI avi-
ation that presents additional motiw_tion for det('('t-
ing a possible probh'm early is t he use of twin-engine
air(Taft for exten(h'd transport operations over wa-
ter, kiloWll as ET()PS (extende(t lranst)ort ot)era-
tions). ETOPS-rated air('raft are allowed to be as
far as 90 minutes away frolll Ill(' nearest suit able air-
port. If the consequences of a fault can 1)e minimized
in this situation, then the effect of lhe fault on lhe
flight may also be minimized. Thus. an earlier recog-
nili(m of a possibh' problem may decrease the severity
of a failm'e alia thus increase the safely of the flight.
One method fl)r enhancing the i'eeognition of a
(t(,velot)ing problem is to presenl information to the
pilot on the predicted behavior of the system. This
information could also allow for an earlier indication
of the severity an(t urgency of a 1)rol)lem, as ('on(pare(1
wilh the case in which tit(' tirst symptom is a caution
or warning alert. Currently, pih)ts must make pre-
dictions based on "raw" in%rmation: that is. they
must calculate how quickly a parameler indicalor is
increasing or decreasing, whet her il is accelerating or
decelcratillg, and how far the indicator must travel to
reach the alert threshold. Then. they musl (tecide if
this iTffornmtion signals an existing or potential prob-
lenl, hov< lllllch time is available lo deal with it, and
howurgentthe problemis. Unfortunately,Wick(ms
(ref. 3) statesthat a conservative bias is present in
any prediction. This would result in underestinlating
the time to an alert, which would affect the criticality
of attending to the problenL
Aids designed to improve the pilot's ability to
make these predictions could show a near-term his-
torical value of the parmneter or could comtmte and
display a near-term predictive value of the tmrame-
tel A history of the tmrameter value is exact be-
cause the actual past values are known, but this re-
quires the pilot to calculate future values from past
I)arameter behavior. However, if hist(wicaI informa-
tion proved to be as beneficial as predictive infor-
mation, then displaying historical information to the
t)ilot would he preferred because of the easier com-
putational task. Unfortunately, evidence shows that
hlllnans have some difficulty in aptflying historical
values in making predictions. For examph,, when es-
timating the next point in a time series from a static
display, Van Heusden (ref. 4) found that when tbwer
historical data points were displayed, subjects for-
got tile essential information given in the preceding
points that were no longer visible. This forgetfuhmss
resulted in errors in estimating the next point in the
time series, and thus these errors contributed to an
overestimated velocity and an underestimated accel-
eration. Spenkelink (ref. 5) also fimnd that historical
information hindered a subject's ability to detect an
oncoming abnormality in a dynamic situation, an(l
he concluded that the historical information had an
inhibiting effect.
On the other hand, providing predictive wtlues
will more directly aid the pilot ill determining how
nmch time remains until an alert occurs, but these
values may be less accurate depending on the forecast
time. Therefore, in order to test both historical and
pre(lictive information ill an aviation-type task, the
workstation study described in this paper evaluated
pilot information aids for predicting the alert time
(the time t;o an alert).
Objectives
The main objective of this research effort was
to examine how presenting near-term historical or
predictive information affected the pilot's ahility to
make a long-tcrnt pre(liction ()f when an alert would
occur. Thus, the primary factor studied was the
type of information provided rather than its fornlat.
The historical or predictive information presented
was near term, that is, 5 sec into the past or fllturc.
All alerts that the pilot had to predict occurred
in the long term, that is, an order of magnitude
greater than the near-term historical or predictive
information provided. Besides determining whether
this information aided the pilot, this study began to
delineate the effects of various factors on the pilot's
ability to judge the tiIne to an alert..
A secondary objective of this effort was to eval-
uate suhjectively how intuitive the display designs
were. Although the focus was 011 information content
instead of format, obtaining some indication that the
format chosen was reasonable was also desirable.
To address these objectives, a controlled exper-
iment was conducted by using a COmlmter work-
station. A description is given of the independent
variables chosen as well as the rationale for examining
them ill this context.
The four independent factors studied were (1) dia.1
type, (2) scenario h,vel of complexity, (3) dis-
play viewing time, and (4) diree(ion of tmrameter
movement. Each fhctor is (lescribed l)elow.
Dial Type
The three types of dial displays evaluated were
current values (standard), current values t)lus histor-
ical infbrmation (history), and current values plus
predictive information (predictive). All displays de-
picted round dials because pilots were most familiar
with this format. The displays used were intended
to he generic and thus did not depict any particu-
lar subsystem gauge with which a i)ilot may have
been familiar. This prevent, ed the pilot from associ-
ating the behavior and the design of the dial with a.
specific subsystem. For all dials, the green normal
range was 40 to 175 units, the amber caution range
was 175 to 200 units, and the red warning range was
0 to 40 units. (See fig. 1.) Thus, the total range of
the dial was 0 to 200 units, encompassing 220 ° of a
circular arc. The digital readout of tile wdue was al-
ways green in color because the value was always in
the nornml range during this experiment.
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Figure 1. Standard dial.
The standard dial was labeled "STANDARD"
abow_ the dial. (See fig. 1.) The history dial (shown
IIISTORY
Figure2, [ti_torydial.
in fig.2), was similar to the standard dial. but out-
side the arc was a white T calh'd the history Hug
and above the dial was the word "qtlST()RY." This
display bug showed the dial value 5 sec in the past.
The predictive dial (shown in fig. 3), which added a
differ¢,nt piece of information to the stamtar_l dial.
had a white diamond-shaped bu_, called lhe predic-
tiw' bun which showed the value 5 sec into the fit-
ture. A1)ove th(, dial was the word "I_I/EDICTIVE. '"
N)r this experiment, the predictive dial was ideal in
that the actual i)aram('ter value in 5 s('(' was exactly
as the t)redicliv(' bug indicat_'d, although pilots wow
not t.old this.
PREI) ICTIVE
_- Prcdiclivc bug
(while)
F'igurc 3. Predictive dial.
The different shatmd bugs and the (tial title added
salient cues about which display the pilot was cttr-
rently using. The history amt predi(:tiv(' dials looked
similar, and confusion tmlwcen the two would have
arisen if thcst' cues had not been present.
Scenario Level of Complexity
Th(, second factor examined was ttw (liffi,rent
ways that. the t)aram('t(,r t)(qmvc(t. This factor was
ac(:omt)lished 1)y using t.ime prolih,s of wlrying difii-
c0.lties, or levels (if comph'xit.y. Each t)r()file followed
one of three lov(,ls of comt)h'xity: simple, medium, or
difficult.. Simple parameter b('havior had a (:OllStatlt
rate of change of the pa.ramet(_r value. M(,(lium pro-
files (h,eelera.t('(t throughout the t)r(/fih', and difficult
l)r()tih,._ first accch'rat('(t and then decel('ratc(t. These
three levels of c(/mt)h'xit.y were employed for several
r(,asons. First,, failmes may have mfique manifesta-
ti()ns t hat the pilot prot)at)ly w(/ul(t not know a priori.
S('(:oml, a t)ilot's al/ility to (,stimat(' the tim(' when
the value woul(t reach an alert range wouht I)r(/l)ably
d(,p('n(t on the level of comph'xity ()f the parameter
I)(,havi(/r. Finally, fl)r ('()Iist,:tIll ra|es of ('flange of t)a-
ram('t, er values, the history and pre(li('tive dials w()ul(l
h)ok i(h,nti('al cx(:('pl for ill(' r(qativ(' position of the
bug, whi('h w(/uhl trail the value for the history dial
or lead the value for l iw pr('(li('t ix:(' dial.
ll(,(:aus(' Ill(, simt)h'-l('vel l)r()iiles had a ('(instant
rat(' ()f ('hau_4(' (tiN. 4), tilt' (lislan('(' I)etw('('u th(' ling
and th(' actual value (lid not ('hang('. Thus, Ill(' time
to an alert was a simI)h' (,xtral)olation of the distance
1)(,tw(,(,n the history or l)redictiv(' 1)u_4s and the actual
value divid('(t into the distance between the a('lual
value and tile t)(,gimfing of th(' alert rang('. This value
then had t()I)(' multiplied l)y 5 se(' (the lag/lead time
of Ill(' bug) to ge! Ill(' tilllC t() all alert.
Nh,tlimn-l(wel tim(' t)r()fih's f()lh)wc(1 tile S(tllar('
root ()f time. (See fig. 4.) ('()nstants w('r(' s('t so
that the I)r()fih's wer(' always (h,('(,h'raling.
The difiicult-h'vcl t)r(ltiles first a('c('hq'at('d and
then (l(,('eh'rate(t. Figure .1 shows th(' general profile
for increasing trials. For these trials, the (h'('eleration
began at least 2 s('(' heft)re the pile! had to estimate
the time to an alert s(/ as to ensme that th(' t.ime
pr()file did not. purposely mislea(1 the pih)t about its
de(:(qcrat ion.
Th(' three profiles had several ast)e('l.s in c(/mmou.
Dm'ing the trial, the (tial [)()inter (lid not. change
(tir('('ti(m 1)(,('ause the viewing lime was assmno(l to
I)e in._utti('i('nt for the pilot to factor in (lire('th)md
changes. The in('rcasinN profiles stot)t)e(l at 125 milts.
and the (lecrcasing t)r(_files st()pt)('(l at 90 milts. In
1)oth cases, t,lm value was 50 units from an alert rang('
at the end of a trial. Th(' t rials were (tesign('d so that.
the pr(,(ti('tiv(' bug was n(,v(,r in an alert rang(' at the
(m(t ()I' a trial. This f()r('od the pilot t()extrat)()late tilt'
t,ime t() an alert from Ill(' inf(_rmation availal)le, and
it, (lid not give an mffair a(tvalltag(' t() the t)redi('tiv('
dial. At t,h(' t)(!ff, illllillg ()f ('a('}l trial, ncitlwr Ill(" t)lt,_s
nor Ill(' actual value starte(t in an ah,rt area. Thus.
pilots (lid Ill)| C()llfllS(' the alert rang(' f()r whi('h they
wow estimathlg the tim(' to an alert.
If (,a('h sc(,uari() could ('(mtinu(' mfinterruI)ted af-
ter reachinp; O0 or 125 units, all param(q('r values
w(luhl reach a caution or a warninN range 20 t(i 80 sec
later. Th(' pilots wcr(' not tohl this. Fm'thermorc.
tim resI)()ns(' ch()i('(,s were between 10 and 120 sec so
that the t)ilot.s were no! l/iase(t to choose 1)(qwo(m 20
180r Alert=175
I- .... ...... --. _..-_ _--_-:_""
160 [- ._ .._ _ .--
120 __
__ Profile level
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Figure 4. Complexity levels of scenario.
and 80 sec. No alerts occurred during the dynamic
presentation.
Display Viewing Time
The third factor was tile amount of time during
which the pilot could study the dial (5 or 10 sec)
before having to estimate the time to an alert. The
two display viewing times were chosen to find their
influence on the pilot's ability to estimate the time to
an alert. They were also representative of the time
that a pilot might normally view an instrument for
monitoring purposes.
Direction of Movement
The fourth and last factor was the direction of pa-
rameter movement, ttalf the_,scenarios had increasing
parameter values, and the. other half had decreasing
parameter values.
Experiment Design
Subjects
Eighteen male active-airline pilots used the
displays described above. The pilots averaged
7000 hours of flight over 13 years of flight experi-
ence, with half of those years being commercial ex-
perience. The maximmn number of hours that a pilot
had was 16 000 and the mininmm was 3000. The av-
erage age was 38, with the oldest being 59 and the
youngest being 29.
Test Design
The test design of the experiment was a four
factor (3 x 3 x 2 x 2), within-subject repeated-
measures design. As described above, the four in-
dependent factors were (1) the dial type (standard,
history, or predictive); (2) the scenario level of com-
plexity for the parameter behavior (simple, medium,
or difficult); (3) the display viewing time (5 or 10 see);
and (4) the direction of parameter movement (in-
creasing or decreasing). The dial types were grouped,
whereas the three scenario levels of complexity, the
two display viewing times, and the two directions
of movement were randomized for each display" type.
Trials for each dial type were conducted consec-
utively. Because the display types were blocked,
each pilot saw one of six dial sequences. All pos-
sible pernmtations of the three dial types were seen
equally among the pilots. The experiment consisted
of 24 data trials per dial type with a total of 72 trials
per pilot. This resulted in two trials for each combi-
nation of the four independent factors. Furthermore,
the protiles were blocked, that is, one set for the in-
troduction, another for the demonstration trials, one
for tile t)ractice trial, and the last set for the data
collection trials.
Dependent Measures
The three dependent measures collected were
(1) the accuracy of predicting when an alert would
occur, (2) the time required to make that prediction,
and (3) the sut)jective rankings of the various display
When will the value reach an alert range?
lO _ 30 40 50 6(1 70 80 90 I00 1 I0 120
Figure 5. Question screc,n,
factors. The computer recorded the pilots' predic-
tions and response times. Subjective data, collected
nlainly through a questionnaire, explicitly solicited
pilots' likes and dislikes concerning the information.
Hypotheses
In considering tile four indei)en(tent factors and
objectives of this study, tile following were hyt)othe-
sized. For the inain factor of dial type, pilots would
nlake predictions with explicitly displayed predictive
inforination nlore quickly and accurately, but his-
torical information would not be ms beneficial (as
Vail Heusden (ref. 4) and Spenkelink (ref. 5) found).
However, having tile information would be better
than having no information at all. The dial sequence,
an artifact of the experilnent design, should not have
an effect oil predicting the time to an alert. Regard-
ing tile three time profiles, pilots would he tile nlost
accurate with constant rate-of-change time profiles
and would have the most difficulty with time profiles
that hax,e accelerating and then decelerating portions
because of conservative biases in prediction. For con-
slant rate-of-change trials, no difference should occur
between displaying historical and t)redictive values.
In considering the display viewing time, pilots would
be more accurate with the longer display viewing
time because they would have nlore time and infor-
mation on which to base their prediction. Lastly, tile
direction of parameter movenlent shoul(t not affect
predicting tile time to an alert.
Procedure
First, a pilot received written instructions (te-
scribing the experiment and a full description of each
display. In general, he was told that for tile data tri-
als, a computer workstation would display a dial for
5 or 10 sec. After tile dial aninlation, a question
would replace the dial on the screen. He would an-
swer the question t)5' using the "mouse" to choose one
of tile possible answers.
Next, the pilot saw six denlonstration trials that
included the three scenario complexity levels. The
pilots were not told about the different parameter
behavior conlplexities. At the end of (,ach demon-
stration trial, the pilot was told the anl(mnt of time
needed for the t)arameter to reach the appropriate
alert range, to the nearest 10 sec. This time was the
answer sought fronl the pilot during lhe data trials.
Before the (tata collection trials, a m(,(limn-level
practice trial was run in which the proce(hlre was
similar to the (tata colleclion trials described t)eh)w.
The only difference fronl a data trial was that after
the pilot estimate(t the time to an alert, the next
screen displayed the correct answer. The demon-
stration scenarios an(t the practice scenarios provided
feedback on the length of time nee(ted for the paranl-
eter to reach an alert range. No feedback was given
during the data trials.
After the practice trial, the data collection trials
began for that dial. Before each trial st.arte(t, a screen
reminded tile pilot of the display type that he wouhl
see and the length of tinle that it wouht appear on
tile screen. This minimized any startle effects at the
t)eginning and end of each trial. Following tile pilot's
push of the mouse button, tile dial animation I)egan
1 sec after the dial at)t)eared. After 5 or 10 sec, the
question that tile pilot needed to answer repIace(t the
dial, and he chose the answer with the mouse. For
each data trial, the question that the pilot had to
answer as quickly and as accurately as possil)le was.
When will the value reach an alert range? (See fig. 5.)
Pilots were not instructed on how to trade speed
for accuracy. With tile mouse, the pilot chose the
estimated time to an alert, fronl that point in time,
to the nearest 10 sec. The 10-see intervals, which
forced all pilots to use the sanle interval in predicting,
helpe(t to control one b(,tween-subject difference.
Once the pilot chose an answer, the computer
recorded his response to the question and the tinle
that he took to answer the question. Then, the
next introduct()ry screen apt)eared. \Vhen tile pilot
finishe(t the 24 trials for a particular (tial tyt)c, the
next dial type in the se(luence ret)eate(t the at)eve
procedure.
At the end of tile experiment, the pilot filled out
a questionnaire ranking the information given on the
Tat)le1.Significant()bjectiveResulls
[N,S.indicatt'sdatathatarenotsignilicant]
Etfector
Dialtype:
Standard.........
History . .........
Predictive.........
Conq)h'xity:
Simple. ..........
Medimn..........
l)ilficult ..........
Viewingtime:
5 se(: ...........
1(} see ...........
Direction:
])e('reasing .........
Incre_using .........
Difference in
10-see intervals
Mean o-
N,_.
N.S.
N.S.
0.8
1).5
2,2
N._,
i N.S.
N,S.
1.7
2.1
2.3
1
i N.S,
N,S.
N._.
N,S.
N._.
N.S.
X._,
N.S.
A bsolul (' diff('relw('
in i0 s('(' int('rvals
Tim(' to choose
answ('r, so('
.M(,an
1.8 1.5
2.1 1.7
2.(/ 1.7
1,3 1.2
1.9 1.5
2,6 l ._
N.S.
N.S.
1.9
2.0
cr Mean
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S. I0.00
N.S. 8.6O
1.5 N.S.
1.7 N.S,
N._,
N.S,
N.S.
N.N.
N.S.
N.S.
S.(i
8.0
N._.
N.S.
displays. (See the appendix.) Other questions on
the usefulness of this added information were also
included.
Data Analysis
The main objective of this experiinent was to ex-
amine how presenting near-term historical or predic-
five information afli'ctcd the pilot's ability to make
a long-term prediction of when an alert would occur.
Thus, the difference was calculated between the pi-
lot's estimate of the time required for the value to
reach an alert and the actual time required to reach
an alert, rounded to the nearest 10 sec. The actual
time that the dial took to reach an alert was rounded
to the nearest 10 see because the pilots could answer
only in increments of 10 see. Both this difference and
the al)solute value of the difference were analyzed.
The second dependent measure analyzed was the
time required for the pilot to (:hoose his answer. The
objc'ctive data were analyzed by using the general lin-
ear models (GLM) procedure in the SAS Institute's
SAS/STAT statistical contt)uter program. (See ref. 6,
pp. 549 640.) Also analyzed with the GLM package
were the data indicating the differences in predictions
and response t ililes alnollg the varyillg complexities
of parameter behavior, the amomlt of time that the
pilot could study the dial, and the direction of param-
eter movement. The Newman-Keuls posttest (ref. 7.
pp. 346 351) was used to analyze multiple pairs of
nleans for significant eff(,cts (p _ 0.05) if the com-
binations involved were less than eight in number;
otherwise, further postanalysis involved the Tukey
HSD (honestly significant difference) method (ref. 7.
t)t). 352 and 353) t)ecause it controlle(t the "family-
wise" error rate bett('r when making all t)airwise
conq)arisons anlOllg several group Ineans.
For the secondary objective of evaluating subjec-
tively the intuitiveness of the display designs, the
data consisted primarily of answers to the ques-
tiommire administered at, the end of the test. For
ranking data, -3 was _Lssigned to the lowest rat-
ing and +3 was assigned to the highest rating.
The rankings were analyzed t)y the SAS/STAT non-
parametric analysis of variance (NPARIWAY) on
ranks (ref. 6, pp. 713 726) and the SAS/STAT GLM
t)rocedllr(?. Frequc'ncies and averages were presente(t
for the sul)jective (lata for factors that were signif-
icant (p _< 0.05). Comments made 1)y pilots (luring
the test were also recor(lcd and r('t)orl(,(t.
Results and Discussion
Dial Type
The hyt)othesis was made that the 1)ilots would
make their predictions of the time to an alert more
quickly and accurately when using the t)r(,dictive dial
than when using the standar(1 or history dials. Al-
though no significant nmin effects were found with
respect to rest)onse time, a significant effect, of dial
type (F2,11 = 5.39, p __<0.03) was found for the ab-
solute vahle of the accuracy of their t)redictions, but
it accounted for less than 1 percent of the variation.
Further analysis showed that even (hough the history
and predictive dials were not significantly different
from eachother, t)oth dials I)roducedlargererrors
than thestandaMdial. (Seetable1.) On theother
hand,fl'omthe subjectivequestionnaire,the pilots
hadmoreconfidenceill their predictionsfiir thehis-
tory andi)rc(tictivedials thenfor the stanttarddial
(F1.6s= 7.04,p _< 0.01).
The dial type ill tile confidence question data ac-
(:olmtcd for 9 percent of the total variation. The pre-
dictive dial had tile highest confidence rating. (See
fig. 6.) Fm'thernlore. wllen colnpared with the ef-
fort required to estimate the time to an alert for
the standard dial, the predictive dial was rated as
requiring the least effort, and the history dial was
rated as requiring less ettk)rt than the st,ail(tard dial
(Fl.(> = 5.12, p _< 0.03). (See fig. 6.) The dial type
accounted for 7 t)erent of the variation in the effort
question data. Thus, the pilots thought the added ili-
fornmtioll incr('ase(1 their a(;cllracy ill estinlating the
time to an alert, but the 1)ih)ts' familiarity with the
standard dial may have overshadowed the perceived
1)eneiits of the added informatioil, or t)eI'hat)s the
history and predictive dials added some unforeseen
colnt)h_xity (ha! degraded prediction pcrforlrnancc.
A significant dial-by-sequence interact ion (Y10.22 -
3.37. p _< 0.01) for the time required fl)r the t)ilots to
predict when an ah,rt would occur was also found.
(See fig. 7.) This interaction at:count('(ltk)r, at nlost,
15 t)(,rccnt of the total variation, which was not sur-
prising in that tilt, t)ilot took lhe short(,st time in
choosing the (line 1.o all alert for lhe last. dial seen
but the longest tinm for the first dial seen ill lilt' se-
(tut'ncc. This can be liar(tally at.l.rilmt(_(1 to learning
effects, including learning cfIk,cts involved ill using
t}lO lllOllS(L
Dial display design. The subjective question-
naire queried pilots about soInt' aspects of th(' dial
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Figure 6. Average effort and confidence sut_jective ratings
('()mpar('d againsl standard dial.
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display design. Most of the comments pertained to
tile history and predictive bugs. The adequacy of
tile lag/lead times of the history anti predictive dial
bugs showed significant differences (F1,3,1 = 11.63,
p _< 0.01), which accounted for 25 percent of the total
variation. Tile pilots thought that the predictive bug
lead time of 5 sec was slightly greater than adequate,
whereas tim history bug lag time of 5 sec was less
than adequate. (See fig. 8.)
>, 4
g 3
-3 -2 -1 (I 1 2
Rating
(a) History dial. Average rating 0.61.
>, 4
g 3
2
-3 -2 - 1 0 1 2 3
Rating
(b) Predictive dial. Average rating = 1.00.
Figure 8. Subjective ratings of'l'ag/lead time of bug.
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(b) History dial. Average rating = 0.56.
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(e) Predictive dial. Average rating 2.17.
Most of the comments about the bug lag/lead
time concentrated on the predictive bug. Even
though pilots rated the predictive bug lead time as
adequate, most said they would have preferred that
the bug have a longer lead tiine, with the average
being approximately 10 sec. In considering the pre-
dictive bug lead time, one pilot mentioned that any
lead time would be helpful, but another remarked,
"The farther into the filture the better."
The overall ratings of the dials were significant
(F2,51 = 8.62, p _< 0.01), accounting for 25 percent of
the total variation. As expected, the predictive dial
Figure 9. Overall dial ratings.
rated the highest, whereas the history, and standard
dials had similar lower ratings. (See fig. 9.)
A few pilots gave reasons for disliking a dial and
thus rating it low. Two pilots, who commented
on the history dial, said that it was of no use in
calculating what will happen and that the bug was
distracting. One pilot rated the standard dial high
because the bugs were too distracting. Two pilots did
not like the predictive dial because they were not sure
8
if they could trust it. These were the only pilots who
had concerns about the accuracy of the predictive
bug, even though no mention of tilt' accuracy of the
prediction algorithm was provided. On the other
hand, one pilot rated tilt, predictive dial high because,
according to him, it provided what pilots Wallt to
know.
Written explanations to some of the questions
provided insight into how some t)ilots would use
the information. Concerning the history dial, one
pilot wanted it for confirmation, whereas another
liked it because it was uset'ul for catching up tm the
behavior of a subsystem. The comments regarding
how they would use the predictive dial dealt mainly
with having an advanced warning to an alert. One
pilot did mention that he would use it to try to
keep that subsystem out of the alert ranges. No
other conlments were made regarding active beha_4or
toward sut)system management.
Other comments pertained to subsystems that
would benefit from this information. Thirteen pi-
lots wanted this information for engine instrmnents,
and tile majority felt that this was the place where it.
would be the most beneficial. Other areas in which
pilots would like this information are systems involv-
ing quantity, pressure, and temperature, as well as
airspeed and altitude indicators.
Pilots' methods of determining when an
alert would occur. Most t)itots were unahle to ver-
balize their methods of deterlnining when an alert
would occur for the standard dial. However, when
asked how they estimated the time to an alert with
the history or predictive dials, most could l)rovide
a method. The majority said that they attempted
to estimate the distance hetween the ling and the
value at the end of the trial. Next., they tried to
calculate how many times that distance divided imo
the dist.anee to the alert range, which was approxi-
mately 50 units away. That mmlber was then multi-
plied by 5 sec (the bug lag/lead time) to get the
approximate time to the alert. They then added
more time to account for the deceleration of the
dial. Tile pilots' methods of estimating the time to
an alert for the history and predictive dials suggest
that the bugs required more processing, thus moving
the pilots from knowledge-based behavior to skill- or
rule-based behavior (ref. 8).
The pilots' inability to verbalize their method
of (tet.ermining when an alert would occur for the
standard dial contributed to the lower overall rating
of the standard dial. This may have also affected the
pilots' confidence ratings of the dials. The confidence
ratings for the history and predictive dials were above
neutral (0) when compared with the standar(t (tial.
Thus, the pilots may have had less confi(ten('e in their
estimate for the time to an alert with the stan(lard
dial.
Scenario Level of Complexity
The author also hYl)(/thesized lha! lhe level of
profile eomt)lexity w(mht affect both the spee(t and
accuracy of the pilots" resI)onses. Although n(i sig-
nificant main effects were found with rest)e('t to
response time, signifi('ant main eit'eets [or accu-
racy were discovered. These efl'eets a('('(iunt('d fin.
ai)t)roximately 38 percent of the variation in the
difference (/*-'2,11 -- 190.59. p _< 0.01) between the ac-
tual and predicted alert times, and ti)r approxi-
mately 17 percent of the variation for the at)so-
lute difference (F2,11 = 33.72, p <_ 0.01). As seen
in table 1 when looking at the difference, the pi-
lots overestimate(t the time t() an alert for the
trials with a simple complexity level and under-
estimate(l the time t() an alert for the medimn and
difficult trials. Therefore, pilots underestimated the
eonstant rate of change of the t)aramett'r value f(ir
the siml)le parameter behavior, and they at)t)eared
to ml(lerestimate the dccelerati(m (if the medium an(t
difficult l)arameter t)ehavior profih,s, thus supt)(irting
the conservative bias in l)re(tiction. Unexpectedly,
analyzing the difference showed that the smallest er-
rors occurred for the medium c()mplexity level, but
the absolute value of the difference may be a lilore
accurate measure because errors cannot ('aneel one
another. When considering the absolute value of the
difference, simple behavior caused the smallest errors
and (liilicult 1)charier caused the greatest errors, a
r('slllt that was exl)eeted t)e('ause }lllIIlallS hi-tve s()Ille
diffi(:ulty in estimating (tecelerati(/n.
Although n(it asked directly in the questiommire,
5 out of 18 t)ilots did mention the ditferen('es in tIa -
rameter t)ehavior COlnph_xiti('s. Only thr(_e l)ilots
made (tir(,et comments that the scenari()s (lid not all
follow the same general t)ehavior. Two liih/ts men-
tioned that estimating lhe time t(i an alert was easier
in the trials with constant or nearly constant rate (if
change than in the trials that ratIidly deeeleraWd.
Overall, most t)ilots felt that all scenarios had ap-
proximately the same difficulty level; hence, the ef-
fort and coIlfidence of t)redietion relnaine(t constanl
within the dial.
Calculation of time to alert assuming con-
stant rate of change. Because the pilots men-
tione(1 that their prediction method used a constant
rat(' of change plus an extra time factor to account
for the deeeleratioIl for the history and predictive di-
als, it was interesting to explore whether the extra
timefactordifferedfordial tYl)eandscenariolevelof
(:omplcxity.If therateof changewereconstant,the
amountof timefor thevahleto reachall alertrange
wasestimatedfromtherat(;of change(thedistance
betweenth("bugandtheactualvalueat theendof
the5-or 10-seevi(,wingtimedividedt)y5 see),that
is.thelag/leadtimeof thebug.Thetimeto analert
wasthenestinmtedby dividingthe rateof change
into50units(thedistanceto the alertrangeat the
endof theviewingtime)andr(mndingthat timeto
thenearest10sec. This time wassubtractedfrom
thepilot's estimateof thetimeto analertto getan
errordifferenceusedin analysis.
Results of assuming constant rate of
change. In the analysis of this error difference, the
complexity level of the t)aramete.r t)ehavior was a sig-
nificant factor (F'2,11 = 23.26, p _< 0.01) accounting
for 6 percent of the total variation. (See table 2.)
Further analysis found that the parameter behavior
complexities varied from each other significantly. If
the rate of change were constant for all cases, pilots
overestimated the time to all alert. Because the pi-
lots had larger errors for the medium and difi-icult
levels of parameter 1)ehavior, the pilots were appar-
ently attempting to account for the deceleration in
the actual scenarios, but th(,y were not accounting
for it adequately, as seen in the accuracy data men-
tioned al)ovc. The difficult scenarios had the most
time added to their estimates, prol)ably due to the
acceleration at the bc, ginnillg of the scenario accen-
tuating the deceleration at the end. Thus, although
most of the pilots did not directly comment on the
different parmncter 1)ehaviors, they did seem to no-
tice some difference t)etween the scenarios in that
they a(htc(t more time at the end of their calcula-
tions for the ine(liunl and difficult levels of parameter
behavior.
play viewing time was not detected, although a sig-
nificant effect was discovered for the time required
to choose an answer (FI.12 = 13.20, p < 0.01). The
viewing time accomlted for only approximately 1 per-
cent of the variation in lhe (let)on(hint nl('asure. As
might t)e exi)e('ted, the longer lhat the t)ih)ts c()uhl
watch tile dial, the less time th('y took in choosing
an answer. (See tal)h_ 2.)
In the subjective (tata. the ade(tuacy of the
(tisplay viewing time fin" lhe different dist)lay types
had two significant factors, tile dial type
(F2,1(12 = 15.74, p <_ 0.01) and the display viewing
time (Fl.I(12 = 16.07, p < 0.01), which accounted for
apt)roxmmtely 21 percent and 11 percent ()f the total
variation, respectively. As illustrated in figure 10,
the predictive dial had the highest rating, and the
10-se(: viewing time had a higher rating than the
5-see viewing time f()r all dials.
Most pilots commented that they wanted to ob-
serve the dial for at. least 10 sec. with tit(; average be-
ing around 15 sec; therefore, it t)ecame interesting to
see if their ratings supported their comments. Thus,
the viewing times were extrapolate(l DOln the sul)je(:-
tive ratings of the display viewing time. "i_) a(:hieve
a rating of 3, the pilots would supposedly need to
view the history and t)redictive dials for at)proxi-
mately 18 see and 19 sec, respectively. Therefl)re,
the pilots' (:omments regarding th(" desire to view the
dial for 15 sec were corroborated by their ratings.
Notice that increasing the predictive bug lead time
t.o 10 se(: and increasing the viewing time to 15 scc is
lle_tI" the earliest time to an alert in t,his ext)erinmnt.
Furtherinore, if the standard (lial viewing time is ex-
trat)olated to achieve a rating of 3, pilots wouht sup-
t)osedly nee(t to see the dial for nearly 30 sec. Notice
that 30 sec is the earlies! time to an alert for th('
trials.
Tabh _2. Significant Results if V(qo('ily Wore Constant
(?onlt)lexity
Simple .....
Medium ....
Difficult ....
l)iffer(',me in
10-se(" intervals
0.7 1.7
1.2 1.6
2.0 1.7
Display Viewing Time
The third main experimental hypothesis was that
a longer viewing time wouhl allow the pilots to be
more accurate in their predictions. This effect of dis-
Two pilots (lid not care how long the dial was
shown bccauso they were going t.() take action only
when the vahle reache<l an alert range, and thus they
were not concerned over what happened t)efore the
alert. Two pilots wanted to be told (tirectly when
the value would reach an alert range t)ecause they
felt thal watching the dial and estimating the time
to an alert wouht lead to a fixation on that dial. As a
result, some pilots wanted to know when an alert was
going to occur, whereas others want('d to know the
information only if required actions were associated
with it.
Direction of Movement
Unext)ectedly, the direction of parameter move-
ment was a significant factor (FI.12 = 6.55, p < 0.03),
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Figure 10. Gul).jcctiw' ratings of average display viewing tim('.
t)ut it. accounted for less than 1 percent of the to-
tal variation. (See ta|)le 2.) Comments involving
the ranking questions showed a minimal effect on
the effort rating t)ccause of the direction of move-
ment of the value. Thirteen of the 18 pilots perceived
no difference in their effort between trials when the
value was increasing and trials when the value was
decreasing.
Concluding Remarks
Although the pilots said that they pref(,rred the
near-term predictiw' information, the objective data
showe(t no t)erformanee advantage in using it fi)r
estimating the alert time (th(' time to an alert). Even
though a small positive effect occurred because of
(tial sequencing, which was attrilmted to learning
effects, the standard dial led to smaller aI)solule
prediction errors. Comments made t)y the pilots
suggest that with the new information, many were
t)usy trying to calculate the time to an alert, whereas
with the start(lard dial, predietil_g was more of a
perceptual process. Because milfimal expli('it mental
calculations were ina(te for the standard (tial, pih)ts
were bett(,r able to estimate the time to an alert.
However, the lack of a conscious method use(l on
the standard (tial t.o calculate the time to an alert
led to poorer ratings for that dial. even though
pilots l)erfl)rmed better with it.. The history and
1)redictive bugs may have also t)een a distraction, or
t)erhat)s pilots simt)ly did better with the st, an(lard
dial 1)ecause they were fanfiliar with it,.
Presentatioll variables also influenced the effec-
tiveness of the historical and predictive information.
For instance, the longer the t)ilots watched the dial,
the quicker they couht estimate the time to a,n alert.
Furthermore, the direction of lllOVelllt?tlt Inay ]lave
iilfluenee(t the pih)ts' t)erceive(t st)ee(t changes in the
value of the parameter. Also, several pih)ts men-
tione([ that the lag/lea(t times of the hist()ry and
predictive I)ugs were too short. Many wouht have
preferred a longer lag/lead time. Lastly, t)ilots ' com-
ments suggest that the use of the tmgs led them to
prettict the time to an ah'rt primarily on the rate of
C}l}tllge of t)aranleter vahte as ju(tged by the (tistanc('
|mtween the bug an(t the actual value. This may not
have occurre(t if a different format for the informa-
tion had been used. Thus. the confidences in and the
preferences for a t)articular fl)rmat do not guarantee
the effective use of that format, as seen in the objec-
tive results not SUl)l)orting the hypothesize(t benefit
of this form of presenting the near-term historical and
predict ive informalion.
11
As hypothesized, the level of complexity of pa-
rameter behavior was a significant factor, but the
dial type did not affect the pilots' ability to predict
the time to an alert for any of the scenario complex-
ities. Pilots were unable to compensate completely
for the differences in the behavior. For the medium
and difficult parameter behaviors, pilots considered
the decelerating trend in predicting the time to an
alert., but. the time that they added to their esti-
mate was not sufficient t.o fully overcome their under-
estimation of the rate of change of parameter value.
As a result, both deceleration and rate of change
were underestimated, thus supporting a general
conservative bias in prediction.
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
Jmmary 6. 1994
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Appendix
Subjective Evaluation
For each of the following questions, please either write out your answer or mark the block that
best describes your answer. The blocks in between the extremes and the middle of each scale
indicate not as much. Do not mark on the block dividers. If you run out of room for the written
answers, feel free to use the back of a sheet.
Definitions: much more effort - much more mental effort required
about the same - neither particularly difficult nor easy
much less effort - much less mental effort required
very unsure - not very confident
about the same - neither particularly sure nor unsure
very sure - very confident
very inadequate - not enough to accomplish task
adequate - just enough to accomplish task
very adequate - more than enough to accomplish task
As you probably remember, the trials were of different lengths. Half the trials only had the dial
on the screen for 5 seconds while the other half had the dial on the screen for 10 seconds. In
the following questions
the 5 second trial = the trials where the dial was on the screen for 5 seconds
and
the 10 second trial = the trials where the dial was on the screen for 10 seconds
The following page reviews the dials you have just seen.
13
The standard dial refers to the dial with no extra information pictured.
STANDARD
The history dial refers to the dial with the T outside the dial, which displayed the parameter's
value 5 seconds ago.
HISTORY
The predicti{/e dial refers to the dial with the filled-in diamond, which showed what the parameter's
value will be in 5 seconds.
PREDICTIVE
14
1. Compared to the standard dial, how much effort was needed during the 5 second trials to
determine when the value would reach a caution or warning region
i) with the history dial?
!
much more about the much less
effort same effort
ii) with the predictive dial?
much more about the much less
effort same effort
iii) During the 5 second trials, were there any differences in your effort to predict the time
to an alert between trials with increasing values or trials with decreasing values? If yes,
describe.
iv) During the 5 second trials, were there any differences in your effort to predict the time to
an alert among the trials? If yes, describe.
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2. Compared to the standard dial, how much effort was needed during the 10 second trials to
determine when the value would reach a caution or warning region
i) with the history dial?
I I I
much more about the much less
effort same effort
ii) with the predictive dial?
I I 1 I
much more about the much less
effort same effort
iii) During the 10 second trials, were there any differences in your effort to predict the time
to an alert between trials with increasing values or trials with decreasing values? If yes,
describe.
iv) During the 10 second trials, were there any differences in your effort to predict the time to
an alert among the trials? If yes, describe.
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3. Compared to the standard dial, how sure were you during the 5 second trials of your decision
of when a value would reach a caution or warning region
i) with the history dial?
I i I I
very about the very
unsure same sure
ii) with the predictive dial?
I l I I
very about the very
unsure same sure
iii) During the 5 second scenarios were there any differences in how sure you were of your
prediction time to an alert between trials with increasing values or trials with decreasing
values? If yes, describe.
iv) During the 5 second scenarios, were there any differences in how sure you were of your
prediction time to an alert among the trials? If yes, describe.
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4. Comparedtothestandard ial,howsurewereyouduringthe10secondtrialsofyourdecision
ofwhena valuewouldreacha cautionorwarningregion
i) withthehistorydial?
I I I I I
very about the very
unsure same sure
ii) with the predictive dial?
I I I
very about the
unsure same
I
very
sure
During the 10 second scenarios, were there any differences in how sure you were of your
prediction time to an alert between trials with increasing values or trials with decreasing
values? If yes, describe.
iv) During the 10 second scenarios, were there any differences in how sure you were of your
prediction time to an alert among the trials? If yes, describe.
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5 How adequate was the 5 second viewing for determining when an alert was going to be
reached
i) with the standard dial?
I r
very adequate very
inadequate adequate
ii) with the history dial?
J
very adequate very
inadequate adequate
iii) with the predictive dial?
[ L I
very adequate very
inadequate adequate
6 How adequate was the 10 second viewing for determining when an alert was going to be
reached
i) with the standard dial?
very adequate very
inadequate adequate
ii) with the history dial?
very adequate very
inadequate adequate
iii) wi'ch the predictive dial?
very adequate
inadequate
I ..... l__
very
adequate
19
7. Howmuchtimewouldyouliketoseethedialfordeterminingwhenanalertwouldbereached
andwhy?
8. Howadequatewasthe5 secondlookbacktimefor thebugwhichdisplayedthe previous
valuefordeterminingwhenanalertwasgoingto be reached?
I I
very adequate very
inadequate adequate
9, How adequate was the 5 second look ahead time for the bug which displayed a future value
for determining when an alert was going to be reached?
I 1 I I
very adequate very
inadequate adequate
10. How much time backward and forward would you like the history and predictive bugs to show
and why?
2O
11. On the scale below, please rate the displays. You may put more than one display type in a
box. Please look at the example below before making your choices.
Example:
Displays: a
b
c
I I I Ic I lab I
least liked most liked
Displays: standard
history I
predictive least liked
I I I I
most liked
12. Why did you choose the above order?
13. How could the displays you liked the most be improved further?
14. How would you use the history and predictive information?
2]
15.Whichinstrumentswouldyouliketo havethedisplayforandwhy?
16. Pleaserecordanyothercomments,suggestions,orcriticismsyoumayhaveaboutanyofthe
displaytypes,thescenarios,or thewaytheexperimentwasconducted?
22
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rtmntl dial l)res(mlati()]ls); (2) history tint||eating the (:l]rrent value plus the value of the pm'ameter 5 sec in the
I)ast ); an(I (3) l)re(li('tiv( ' (iu(li(:aling tit(' era'rent value t)lus the value of l,h(' parameter 5 se(' into lh(' t'uI ure). Th("
time t)rofih!s d(,scribing the Itchy-iv|or of the t)m'amet.er consistetl of constant rate-of-chang(! proiiles, (iecelerati]lg
t)r()tih,s, and a('('ehwatillg-then-(Iecelerating profiles. Although the pilots in(licate(] that they l)referre(t the near-
ter}u 1)re(lirtive dial, the objective (lata (lid not SUl)t)(Jrt its use. The ol)jective data did show that the lime
l)]()files had the most si_nifi('aut effect ml performan('e in esti]uatin_ lh(' time 1(1 an alert.
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